Part II – China and Russia

It is difficult to watch world leaders publicly affirm international law while powerful states appear able to reinterpret those same rules when it suits their interests. To ordinary people like me, navigating economic strain and widening inequality, this does not feel like principled diplomacy. It feels selective. The rules seem rigid for weaker nations and flexible for stronger ones — morality articulated in formal language but enforced through power.

The explanation, however, is less theatrical and more structural. International law is not evenly enforced because there is no global sovereign authority above powerful states. The system is technically anarchic — meaning there is no overarching enforcement mechanism capable of compelling compliance from major powers. Large states bend rules more easily than small ones. The United States has done it. Russia has done it. China does it. Regional powers do it. Power asymmetry explains more than conspiracy.

Smaller or economically distressed nations often comply with international norms not because they are naïve, but because the cost of defiance is far higher for them. Sanctions, trade isolation, frozen assets, and diplomatic exclusion fall harder on the weak than on the strong. This imbalance generates resentment and feeds the perception of a hegemonic order. The perception is not born from ignorance; it emerges from lived asymmetry.

At the same time, political systems are not abstractions. They are run by individuals, humans. And some individuals exhibit traits psychologists describe as the “Dark Triad”: narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. When those traits cluster, leaders may manipulate systems without empathy and rationalize harm as strategy. What many describe as “evil” often reflects this pattern — ambition fused with diminished moral restraint.

The deeper complication is that societies sometimes reward traits that resemble narcissism. Confidence, dominance, and performative certainty are frequently mistaken for strength. In times of instability, those traits become especially attractive. Civilization can act as an amplifier, elevating personalities whose attributes later prove destructive. In my country we are not merely observers of such figures; many of us participate in their rise.

The result can look like coordinated design. More often, it is the predictable outcome of structural power imbalances interacting with human ambition. International institutions lack equal enforcement power. Economic systems concentrate influence. Political incentives reward spectacle and division. Individuals operate within those incentives — some responsibly, others ruthlessly.

This does not absolve injustice. But it shifts the explanation from secret omnipotence to systemic imbalance — and systemic imbalance is far more difficult to confront, because it implicates institutions, incentives, and, at times, ourselves.

Enduring Patterns in U.S. and Israeli Posture Toward Russia and China.

Long-run U.S. posture toward Russia and China is organized around a dual-competitor problem with asymmetric urgency: China is framed as the “pacing challenge,” while Russia is treated as an “acute” threat that can force near-term mobilization and escalation management—especially in Europe and the nuclear domain. The operational implication is persistent two-theater deterrence under resource constraints, implemented through (a) alliance commitments and regional campaigning, (b) a large overseas basing network, (c) technology and economic statecraft, and (d) nuclear deterrence and (increasingly fragile) strategic stability arrangements.

The durable Israeli posture toward Russia and China is indirect: Israel’s core security focus remains regional (notably the northern front and Iran-linked networks), and its interactions with Russia and China are primarily about (a) preserving freedom of action in Syria through deconfliction and diplomatic management with Russia, and (b) leveraging economic opportunity from China while preventing strategic dependence, technology leakage, or U.S. political/defense backlash. 

A central structural difference is that the U.S. can apply system-level levers (alliances, global defense posture, dollar-centered financial measures, export controls, investment screening, and nuclear signaling) at scale. Israel’s levers are narrower and mostly operate through balancing choices: maintaining U.S. trust (defense technology and intelligence sharing), managing Russia in the Syria theater, and constraining China exposure via export controls and investment screening. 

U.S. strategic posture toward Russia and China

Threat framing and deterrence logic:

The U.S. strategic frame in the 2022 National Defense Strategy centers deterrence around integrated deterrence—the coordinated use of military power with other instruments of national power and allies/partners—while explicitly prioritizing China as the pacing challenge and treating Russia as an acute threat. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept similarly formalizes a dual focus: Russia as the most “significant and direct threat” to Allied security, and China as a systemic challenge using economic leverage and strategic dependencies, alongside the concern that deepening China–Russia alignment can be mutually reinforcing. 

Structurally, this produces a durable division of labor: – Russia-facing deterrence is anchored in Euro-Atlantic collective defense and reinforcement credibility (force readiness, forward posture, and reinforcement pathways), while managing escalation risks in a nuclear-heavy relationship.
– China-facing deterrence emphasizes theater denial and resiliency in the Indo-Pacific, including dispersed posture concepts and allied capacity, alongside technology controls intended to slow or complicate military-relevant modernization. 

Forward posture and regional hubs:

The U.S. overseas basing network is a core durable enabler—supporting rapid response, deterrence, and assurance. CRS identifies a large footprint globally, with the largest concentrations in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. 

A key structural pattern since 2014 has been greater emphasis on rotational and distributed posture in Europe to deter Russian aggression, and greater emphasis on resiliency/dispersal in the Indo-Pacific to reduce vulnerability to precision strike systems. The European Deterrence Initiative, established in 2015, is explicitly documented as supporting additional rotational forces and expanding operating locations in Europe, with $35.1B (the real number is far greater) spent FY2015–FY2023. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative similarly frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority theater and allocates sizable resources to posture, infrastructure, exercises, and logistics—explicitly stating that current theater logistics posture is inadequate for contested operations. 

These posture choices have durable political constraints: access depends on host-nation agreements, and both Europe and Indo-Pacific posture increasingly rely on a portfolio of sites (persistent bases plus other sites / access arrangements), not a single “main base” model. 

Europe posture is geographically dense (supporting reinforcement and sustainment), while Indo-Pacific posture spans vast distances and relies on dispersed basing nodes and logistics corridors. 

Alliance management: multilateral integration and minilateral innovation:

A durable asymmetry is that U.S. Russia deterrence is institutionalized through NATO’s collective defense system (Article 5 and integrated planning), while U.S. China deterrence is more heterogeneous, combining bilateral alliances plus minilateral “modules.” 

The “hub-and-spokes” logic in Asia—where the U.S. maintains separate bilateral alliances rather than a NATO-like integrated multilateral alliance—has long been treated as a structural feature of the region’s security architecture (with contemporary adjustments via minilaterals). AUKUS reflects this adjustment: it is designed to deepen defense industrial and technology cooperation, including nuclear-powered submarine capability and advanced capabilities development. 

Economic instruments: sanctions, export controls, investment screening, and financial leverage:

Against Russia, the structural U.S. toolkit has emphasized: – Sanctions programs administered by Office of Foreign Assets Control, spanning multiple legal authorities and program categories.
– Export controls administered by Bureau of Industry and Security (expanded significantly after 2022, building on restrictions since 2014). 

Against China, durable features include: – Technology-targeted export controls, including major rulemakings restricting advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items.
– Entity-based controls via the BIS Entity List framework.
– Investment screening inward via Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States authorities expanded through FIRRMA.
– Outbound investment restrictions/notification regimes anchored in Executive Order 14105 and implementing Treasury rules and guidance.
– Tariff-based coercion under Section 301 processes (ongoing institutionalization via maintained tariff lists and periodic reviews). 

The U.S. also benefits from persistent dollar-centered financial leverage. IMF COFER data show the U.S. dollar remains the dominant share of allocated global reserves. Research from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York highlights how financial sanctions can be designed to limit access to cross-border payments and, notably, the SWIFT network—illustrating a structural channel for coercive power. 

The Trump family has gained substantial financial benefits from the USD1 stablecoin and related ventures through World Liberty Financial (WLF).  Key earnings include:

• 75% of net proceeds from $WLFI token sales, which raised over $550 million, with the Trump family receiving the majority of profits. 
• $187 million from the sale of a 49% stake in WLF to an Abu Dhabi investment vehicle (Aryam Investment 1) in late 2025, finalized in early 2026. 
• Hundreds of millions in annual returns from USD1’s Treasury-backed reserves, with Bloomberg estimating $80 million per year in interest income flowing directly to the Trump family business. 
• By December 2025, the Trumps had realized $1 billion in profits from WLF ventures, while holding an additional $3 billion in unsold tokens. 
• Some reports, including from The New Yorker and Coinpedia, suggest total crypto-related profits (including USD1, $WLFI, and meme coins) exceed $1.4 billion as of early 2026. 

These earnings stem from direct revenue shares, equity sales, and interest from stablecoin reserves, all channeled through family-controlled entities like DT Marks DEFI LLC. 

The Greatest Don Con.

I wonder how many members of Congress are in on Trumps illegal, shady crypto con???

Logistics/sustainment constraints and nuclear strategic stability.

Two durable constraints shape U.S. posture versus both Russia and China:

First, the Indo-Pacific’s geographic scale and contested-access environment elevate logistics and base resilience into core deterrence variables. The PDI explicitly states current theater logistics posture is inadequate for contested operations and frames prepositioning, distributed basing, and infrastructure as key investments. 

Second, strategic stability has become structurally more fragile. Arms control erosion is explicitly acknowledged in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept.  The expiration of New START on February 5, 2026 is described by the UN as a “grave moment,” removing binding limits and verification on U.S.–Russia strategic offensive arms. This coincides with DoD assessments that China’s nuclear stockpile remained in the “low 600s” through 2024 and that China remains on track to exceed 1,000 warheads by 2030—strengthening the structural logic for U.S. “integrated deterrence” and for allied reassurance. 

Israel’s posture toward Russia and China

Strategic constraints: geography and prioritization:

Israel’s posture toward Russia and China is constrained by the fact that neither is Israel’s primary day-to-day adversary; instead, they are theatrical and diplomatic variables affecting Israel’s freedom of action and its indispensable U.S. security relationship. CRS summarizes this balancing challenge: Israel seeks to address U.S. concerns about China and Russia while expanding economic relations with China and avoiding Russian disruptions to Israeli military operations in Syria. These are temporary concessions and non-binding agreements⏤Carrot and Stick⏤mix of incentives, spurious economic collaboration and punitive measures when all else fails while Israel and US continue to drive chaos in their quest for global dominance.

Israel’s key geographic and operational constraint is the nearby Syria theater. Russia’s military presence and air defense capabilities in Syria give it influence over Israel’s ability to conduct airstrikes there, creating a structural need for deconfliction and crisis management. 

Russia: Syria deconfliction as a durable operating requirement:

A core structural feature since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria has been Israel–Russia coordination to avoid accidental clashes. Public reporting from 2015 describes agreements and mechanisms to coordinate military actions over Syria. Authoritative Israeli and allied analyses emphasize that Russia’s presence changed the operating environment and required Israel to manage deconfliction to preserve freedom of action. 

This is an enduring pattern rather than a one-off: the deconfliction channel functions as risk management under asymmetric dependence—Israel needs operational freedom in Syria more than Russia needs Israel, while Russia can raise the price of operations through air-defense and airspace management. Russia is losing on this front in 2026.

China: economic opportunity bounded by security guardrails:

Israel and China established formal diplomatic relations in 1992, creating the baseline for long-term economic ties.  Over time, Israel-China economic relations expanded across high-tech and infrastructure investment, with U.S. concerns focusing on sensitive technology and infrastructure access risks. 

A durable structural mechanism regulating this space is Israel’s evolution toward more formal export controls and investment screening, largely shaped by U.S. pressure and strategic trust requirements:

• Israel’s earlier defense industry cooperation controversies (notably Phalcon and Harpy) created strong U.S.–Israel friction and contributed to what CRS describes as an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China. 
• In response to tensions over defense exports to China, Israel’s defense establishment opened a defense export controls division (announced in 2006), and Israel subsequently enacted a Defense Export Control Law (2007) to regulate defense exports in part for foreign relations and international obligations considerations. 
• Israel created a foreign investment advisory committee in October 2019 to evaluate national security implications of foreign investment in sensitive sectors—an institutional guardrail that multiple analyses link to Chinese investment concerns and U.S. pressure. 

Another Israeli/US Trojan Horse:

A particularly salient structural case is the 25-year operating contract for a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport by Shanghai International Port Group, which CRS links to reported U.S. Navy concerns about port proximity to naval facilities and potential espionage risks. {The real risk is to China because this “mutual beneficial contract” is just another ploy in Israel/United States strategic long term plan, but China believes itself to be in control; perhaps they should read more US/Israel history and put some effort into connecting the dots aka trends. Leaders have the tendency to overestimate their cleverness when playing with wildfire. Lots of history on that subject as well.}

Even though Time is the Only Authentic Truth Sayer, the world continues to ignore historic Truths choosing instead to kneel before the most decrepit, immoral, bent men who slaughter and destroy peoples and their countries, including their own citizens. So go on, carry on paying homage to these madmen and their pseudo invincibility⏤ their self proclaimed divinity. What cares do swaddled political persons care about anyone but themselves, protected by the might of reprogramed military personnel under the thin veil of patriotism, so as to enrich and serve arrogant, egocentric masters.